Secure Approximate String Matching for Privacy-preserving Record Linkage

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Abstract—Real-world applications of record linkage often require matching to be robust in spite of small variations in string fields. For example, two health-care providers should be able to detect a patient in common, even if one record contains a typo or transcription error. In the privacy-preserving setting, however, the problem of approximate string matching has been cast as a trade-off between security and practicality, and the literature has focused mainly on Bloom filter encodings, an approach which can leak significant information about the underlying records.

We present a novel public-key construction for secure two-party evaluation of threshold functions in restricted domains based on embeddings found in the message spaces of additively homomorphic encryption schemes. We use this to construct an efficient two-party protocol for privately computing the threshold Dice coefficient. Relative to the approach of Bloom filter encodings, our proposal offers formal security guarantees and greater matching accuracy. We implement the protocol and demonstrate the feasibility of this approach in linking medium sized patient databases with tens of thousands of records.

Index Terms—Homomorphic encryption, secure computation, approximate string matching, privacy-preserving records linkage

I. INTRODUCTION

ECORD linkage is an important activity in health data science which seeks to identify records across datasets belonging to a single entity. Common applications in the health setting include public-health surveillance, efficient allocation of resources, detecting double-enrollments in clinical trials, and creating high-quality medical research datasets. Legislative and policy restrictions such as the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) restrict data sharing between organizations for privacy purposes. This gives rise to the challenge of privacy-preserving record linkage, i.e., a records-linkage functionality that reveals only the identities of patients who are present in both datasets.

This challenge is made considerably harder when linkage must be robust against errors and variations in string fields. In real-world applications, errors can originate from a variety of sources. Common sources include: character edits (a random character is substituted, inserted or deleted); keyboard edits due to human typing mistakes; optical character recognition (OCR) errors due to misclassifications by OCR software; and phonetic errors during speech transcription due to mispronunciation, or ambiguity between spoken names, and their corresponding spelling [1].

In this paper, we consider the problem of privacy-preserving approximate matching, i.e., linking records in the privacy-preserving setting in a manner that is robust against such variations.

A. Limitations of Existing Approaches

Solutions to secure approximate matching must account for a potentially staggering number of possible variations, making a naive public-key approach too computationally intensive to be practical in a real-world setting.

One popular method for approximate matching is Bloom filter encodings (BFEs) [2]. The approach involves parties running strings through a type of locality-preserving hash function in which similar strings produce similar hashes. Data holders send these hashes to a third party linker, who searches for pairs with similar hashes. The main advantage of this approach is speed—the matching algorithm can be run on the hash values directly.

This advantage, however, is simultaneously the cause of its two most significant limitations. One is that it can only approximate its ideal functionality; matching the similarity of hashes produces errors relative to matching the similarity of the strings outright. The second, and most important, is that Bloom filter encodings are fundamentally incompatible with formal security notions or guarantees. Localized features of the string always affect the same bits of the hash, making BFEs semantically insecure by their very design, and numerous papers have proposed cryptanalytic techniques to recover information about underlying patient data [3]–[6]. More recent work has sought to disrupt cryptanalytic efforts through increasingly elaborate counter-measures [4], [7], [8] to mitigate these limitations. Any improvements to security, however, can only be heuristically measured and are often accomplished at the expense of matching accuracy.

B. Contribution

In this paper, we seek a public-key solution to approximate string matching that provides formal security guarantees, but is practical for real-world linkage applications. We introduce a novel public-key construction for computing threshold functions in restricted domains based on embeddings found in...
the message spaces of additively homomorphic encryption schemes. We propose an efficient and secure protocol in the semi-honest model for computing the threshold Dice coefficient. We implement this protocol and demonstrate its feasibility by linking two 20,000 patient record databases in under 2 hours at a cloud computing cost of around $2. The contributions of this paper include:

- A novel approach for homomorphically approximating threshold functions on limited domains in the integer factorization setting,
- An efficient protocol for approximate string matching,
- A simulation-based proof of security of the protocol in the honest-but-curious setting,
- Implementation and performance evaluation demonstrating the feasibility of linking patient name databases in the tens of thousands of records.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Approximate Matching

A common approach to approximate string matching in the field of records linkage involves decomposing strings into sets of $n$-grams and applying a set similarity metric between the two sets \[ \text{Bigrams} \] of a string. Let \( \Sigma \) be a character in which \( \Sigma \nsubseteq \Sigma \). Without loss of generality, in this paper we will focus on bigram decompositions (i.e., \( n = 2 \)).

Definition 1 (Bigrams). Let \( s \in \Sigma^* \) be a string defined on an alphabet \( \Sigma \), and let \( \_ \) be a character in which \( \_ \notin \Sigma \), which will be used to create special bigrams representing the beginning and end of a string. Let \( s(i) \) denote the \( i \)-th character of \( s \). Let \( \parallel \) denote string concatenation. The set of bigrams of an \( \ell \)-character string \( s \) is defined as:

\[
\text{Bigrams}(s) = \{ t(1)t(2), \ldots, t(\ell - 1)t(\ell) \},
\]

where \( t = \_ \parallel s \parallel \_ \).

For example,

\[
\text{Bigrams}(\text{CRYPTO}) = \{ \_C, \_CR, \_RY, \_YP, \_PT, \_TO, \_Q \_ \}.
\]

The set of all bigrams under Definition 1 is:

\[
BG = \{ \_A, \_B, \ldots, \_Z, A_\_B, \ldots, Z_\_A, A_B, \ldots, Z_Z \}.
\]

With the lexicographic ordering above, we can refer to the first bigram, i.e., \( BG(1) = \_A \), the second bigram, \( BG(2) = \_B \), and so on. The set of bigrams has cardinality \( |BG| = 2 \cdot 26 + 26^2 = 728 \). A bigram decomposition \( \text{Bigrams}(s) \) of a string \( s \) is a subset of \( BG \), and thus for all \( s \in \Sigma^* \), \( |\text{Bigrams}(s)| \leq 728 \).

B. Set Similarity

A common metric of set similarity used in the approximate matching literature is the Dice coefficient. Given two sets \( a, b \):

\[
\text{Dice}(a, b) = \frac{2 \cdot |a \cap b|}{|a| + |b|}.
\]

As an example, let \( a = \text{Bigrams}(\text{CRYPTO}) \) and \( b = \text{Bigrams}(\text{KRYPTO}) \), the corresponding Dice coefficient would be

\[
\text{Dice}(a, b) = \frac{2 \cdot 5}{7 + 7} = 0.71
\]

Grzebala and Cheatham [1] note that the Dice coefficient is typically preferable to the related Jaccard index in terms of matching accuracy, and thus we will concentrate primarily on the former for the remainder of this paper, though a protocol for computing the latter would require only a small modification to the protocol presented in this paper. In the secure approximate matching setting we are interested in computing only whether the similarity between two strings exceeds a given threshold.

Definition 2 (Threshold Dice coefficient). Given two sets \( a, b \), and a match threshold \( 0 \leq t \leq 1 \), we define the threshold Dice coefficient as follows:

\[
\text{ThreshDice}(a, b, t) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{Dice}(a, b) \geq t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

C. Secure Approximate Matching

We define records linkage between two parties, \( P_A \) and \( P_B \), whose goal is to identify all records in their respective databases referring to the same entity (i.e., same patient). Extensive literature exists on the topic of privacy-preserving records linkage [1], [10]–[13], especially identifying record fields that match exactly. In this paper, we focus instead on the approximate matching of string fields, and define our ideal functionality in Functionality 1 as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functionality 1: Approximate string matching for records linkage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public parameters:</strong> Match threshold ( t ), database sizes ( m, n ).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Private inputs:</strong> Party ( P_A ) holds a list of patient names ( A = [a_1, \ldots, a_m] ). Party ( P_B ) holds a list of patient names ( B = [b_1, \ldots, b_m] ).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Functionality:** For each \( a_i \in A \) and \( b_j \in B \):
| 1) Let \( a_i \leftarrow \text{Bigrams}(a_i), b_i \leftarrow \text{Bigrams}(b_i) \) |
| 2) Let \( d_{ij} \leftarrow \text{ThreshDice}(a_i, b_i, t) \) |
| **Output:** For any \( d_{ij} = 1 \), \( P_a \) learns \( i \). |

III. RELATED WORK

The literature on record linkage is extensive, as is the field of privacy-preserving record linkage. We direct the reader to the survey of private record linkage techniques by Vatsalan et al. [11], and the survey of techniques for approximate string matching by Grzebala and Cheatham [1].

A related problem in the literature is privacy-preserving pattern matching in which one party learns the locations in a long text where a given pattern appears. Hazay and Toft [14] propose a two-party pattern matching approach in the malicious model based on the additive homomorphic properties of Elgamal, which was extended by Vergnaud [15] based on the Fast Fourier Transform. Chase and Shen [16] approach
the problem of outsourced substring queries using searchable symmetric-key encryption. Kolesnikov et al. [17] approach the problem of secure wildcard matching with oblivious transfer extensions, while the work of Wei et al. [18] incorporates secret sharing.

Much of the work in the public-key setting toward secure evaluation of the threshold Dice coefficient has focused on computing Functionality 1 under partial encryption. Randall et al. [19] propose a fully homomorphic solution for computing the Dice coefficient based on the ring learning with error problem. The construction computes inner-products of Bloom filters under encryption, but the division and threshold steps of Equations 1 and 2 are computed in the clear. Vatsalan et al. [8] propose a similar construction based on additively homomorphic encryption for multiple parties where the threshold is also computed in the clear. Cheon et al. [20] proposed a circuit-based approach to the related problem of secure edit distance based on somewhat-homomorphic encryption.

Public-key approaches in general, however, are often regarded as too computationally intensive [4], [10], [11], [21], and much of the literature has chosen to trade security guarantees in favor of efficiency.

A. Bloom Filter Encodings

Bloom filter encodings (BFEs) were proposed by Schnell [2] as a computationally efficient method for approximate matching based on the original data structure of Bloom [22]. A Bloom filter is an $\ell$-bit vector. $k$ secret hash functions $h_i : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow Z_\ell$ are defined between the two parties. An element $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is inserted into a filter by setting the bit positions pointed to by the respective outputs of $h_1(x) \ldots h_k(x)$.

Each party computes encodings of its respective names and sends the filters to a third-party linker $L$ to be matched. The linker computes the threshold Dice coefficient between each filter’s pair and reports any that exceed the threshold. Bloom filter encodings are not semantically secure by design; similar plaintexts result in similar Bloom filters allowing $L$ to perform the matching. Despite being the subject of ongoing cryptanalytic efforts [3]–[6], [23], Bloom filters continue to be applied in approximate matching applications [21], [24]–[27].

Recently Lazrig et al. [28] proposed performing the Dice coefficient calculation of Bloom filter encodings using garbled circuits. However, Bloom filter encodings are noisy relative to the ideal functionality, which can lead to matching errors.

In the following section, we propose a solution that fully realizes Functionality 1 using a novel cryptographic construction that homomorphically computes the threshold in a single public-key operation.

IV. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS

We begin with several security definitions and notations.

**Definition 3** (Computational indistinguishability). Given a security parameter $\rho$, a function $\mu(\rho)$ is negligible in $\rho$ if for every polynomial $p(\cdot)$, there exists a $\rho_0$ such that $\mu(\rho) < \frac{1}{p(\rho)}$ for all $\rho > \rho_0$. We say two distribution ensembles $X$ and $Y$ are computationally indistinguishable if for every polynomial time distinguisher $D$ there exists a negligible $\nu(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[D(X) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y) = 1] < \nu(\rho).$$

We use the notation $X \equiv Y$ to denote computational indistinguishability of $X$ and $Y$.

**Definition 4** (Semantic security under Chosen plaintext attack). Let $CS = \{Gen, Enc, Dec\}$ be a public key encryption scheme. Let $\mu(\rho)$ be a negligible function in $\rho$, and $A$ be a non-uniform adversary. We define the chosen plaintext attack experiment $Exp_{A, CS}(\rho)$ in the standard way: $PK \leftarrow Gen(1^\rho)$ is run. $A$ can sample the output of $Enc(m)$ polynomially many times for chosen $m$. Finally, $A$ chooses two messages $m_0, m_1$, $c = Enc(m_b)$ is computed for $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and given to $A$, who outputs a guess $g$ for $b$. The experiment returns 1 if $g = b$, and 0 otherwise. $CS$ is semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack if, for every polynomial adversary $A$:

$$Pr\left[Exp_{A, CS}(\rho) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(\rho).$$

**Definition 5** (Semi-honest setting). In this paper we work the semi-honest (honest-but-curious) model: two parties $P_A, P_B$ honestly follow the protocol but might try to analyze the transcript to infer more information about the other party’s inputs. Let $f = (f_A, f_B)$ be a two-party functionality, and let $\pi$ be a protocol for computing $f$. Let $P_A, P_B$ have respective inputs $x_A, x_B$. The view of party $P_A$ of the execution of $\pi$ on their combined input $x = (x_A, x_B)$ is denoted as

$$View_{P_A}(x) = (x_A, r_A, msg_A),$$

where $x_A$ is $P_A$’s input to the protocol, $r_A$ is all random values generated by $P_A$, and $msg_A$ is the set of all messages received by $P_A$ during the execution of $\pi$. The output of $P_A$ in the execution of $\pi$ is denoted $Out_{P_A}(x)$ and is computable from $View_{P_A}(x)$. Similarly, $View_{P_B}(x) = (x_B, r_B, msg_B)$ and $Out_{P_B}(x)$ denotes $P_B$’s view and output of protocol $\pi$ on input $x$.

**Definition 6** (Secure evaluation). Protocol $\pi$ securely evaluates $f$ in the presence of a semi-honest adversary if there exists probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms $P_A^*$ and $P_B^*$ such that

$$[P_A^*(x_A, f_A(x_A)), f_B(x_B)] \equiv [View_{P_A}(x), Out_{P_B}(x)]$$

and

$$[P_B^*(x_B, f_B(x_B)), f_A(x_A)] \equiv [View_{P_B}(x), Out_{P_A}(x)].$$

Let the notation $[x]$ denote the encryption of a plaintext $x$ in a semantically-secure additively homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. Let the notation $r \leftarrow S$ denote an element $r$ sampled uniformly at random from a set $S$. Let $\mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ respectively denote the set of integers, the set of integers modulo an integer $n > 0$, and the set of integers relatively prime to $n$. Throughout this paper we use the notation $\mathbb{Z}_p$ and $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ in the context of a prime $p$. Let $q(p−1)$, and let $\mathbb{G}_q$ denote the cyclic subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ of order $q$. 
Definition 7 (Quadratic residuosity). Recall the Legendre symbol of an integer \( x \) modulo prime \( p \):
\[
\left( \frac{x}{p} \right) \equiv x^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \mod p
\]  
(3)
where \( \left( \frac{x}{p} \right) \in \{-1,0,1\} \). An integer \( x \) is a quadratic residue modulo \( p \) if there exists some integer \( y \) such that \( y^2 \equiv x \mod p \). Let \( QR_{p} : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) be a function denoting the quadratic residuosity of an integer \( x \in \mathbb{Z} \) modulo \( p \in \mathbb{Z} \):
\[
QR_{p}(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x \text{ is a quadratic residue modulo } p \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]  
(4)

Definition 8 (Threshold function). For a threshold \( t \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \), let \( \tau_t : \mathbb{Z}^+ \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) be a threshold function defined as follows:
\[
\tau_t(x) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } x \geq t \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]  
(5)

A. Approximating Threshold Functions in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \)

Consider the Legendre symbols of a sequence of successive elements, \( x, (x+1), \ldots, (x+k) \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \). Except for squares in \( \mathbb{Z} \), which always have a Legendre symbol of 1, such a sequence takes on an irregular, mostly random-looking appearance.

The intuition of our approach comes from the observation that, for certain primes, this sequence may contain subsequences of regularity that locally approximate the output of some well-behaved function. Of course, such an approximation, if it were present, would be entirely coincidental. Its presence, nevertheless, can be exploited to effectively evaluate the function over a restricted domain. Specifically, we exploit the presence of such “well-behaved” subsequences to approximate threshold functions. The intuition is that for a threshold function \( \tau_t \), there may exist a prime \( s \) for which a subsequence generated by \( QR_s \) locally approximates \( \tau_t \).

Definition 9 (\( d \)-approximation of \( \tau_t \)). Let \( s \) be a prime and let \( 0 < f \leq s \) be a value such that
\[
QR_s(x + f) = \tau_t(x)
\]  
(6)
for all \( x \) in the range \( 0 \leq x \leq d \). We say the quadratic residuosity function \( QR_s \) \( d \)-approximates threshold function \( \tau_t \) at \( f \).

For example, \( QR_{277} \) 10-approximates the threshold function \( \tau_6 \) at 179 (see Table I). Using this approach in conjunction with a semantically secure encryption scheme that is additively homomorphic modulo \( s \), we will show how this can be used to evaluate the threshold Dice coefficient homomorphically.

V. Encryption scheme

We now discuss our public-key method for homomorphically evaluating a \( d \)-approximation of \( \tau_t \). Let \( CS = \{Gen, Enc, Dec\} \) be a semantically secure, additively homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. Let \( M \) and \( C \) respectively denote the plaintext and ciphertext spaces of \( CS \). For any two messages \( m_1, m_2 \in M \) let,
\[
Dec(Enc(m_1) \cdot Enc(m_2)) = (m_1 + m_2) \mod s
\]
for a prime \( s \). The value \( s \) will be chosen such that \( QR_s \) \( d \)-approximates \( \tau_t \). For concreteness and efficiency we will specify \( CS \) as special case of the cryptosystem due to Damgård et al. [29], however other options include the cryptosystems due to Benaloh [30], and Groth [31], [32], or more broadly, any additively homomorphic cryptosystem that can accommodate a message space of order \( s \).

Let \( G \) be an algorithm that accepts a security parameter \( \rho \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \), threshold \( t \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \) and domain bound \( d \in \mathbb{Z}^+ \) and outputs:

1) A pair of integers \((\ell, w)\), where the factorization of the product of two random \( \ell \)-bit primes is computationally infeasible, and where the discrete logarithm in a group of prime \( w \)-bit order is computationally infeasible in the security parameter,

2) A prime \( s \), and offset \( 0 < f < s \) such that \( f + d < s \) and \( QR_s(x + f) = \tau_t(x) \) for \( 0 \leq x < d \).

See Table V for computationally derived examples of \((f, s)\) for 2\( \mu \)-approximating a threshold function \( \tau_p \). We now specify key generation, encryption, and decryption functions:

Gen(\( \rho \)): Given security parameter \( \rho > 0 \), run \( G(\rho, t, d) \) to obtain \((\ell, w, s, f)\) as defined above. Pick two random \( w \)-bit primes \( u, v \). Let \( n = pq \) for primes \( p \) and \( q \) such that \( su|(p - 1) \) and \( sv|(q - 1) \). Let \( \mathbb{G}_{suw} \) denote the unique subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) which has order \( su \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and order \( sv \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_q^* \). Let \( \mathbb{G}_{uw} \) denote the subgroup of \( \mathbb{G}_{suw} \) with order \( sw \). Let \( g \) be a generator of \( \mathbb{G}_{suw} \) and let \( h \) be a generator of \( \mathbb{G}_{uw} \). Compute \( \mu = (uv)^{-1} \mod s \), and set \( \lambda = uv\mu \). The public key is \( PK = (n, g, h, u, d, f, s, t) \). The private key is \( SK = \lambda \).

Enc(\( PK, m \)): For a message \( m \) in the range \( 0 \leq m \leq d \), pick a random element \( r \in \{1, \ldots, 2^w - 1\} \) and compute
\[
C = g^m h^r \mod n.
\]
Output ciphertext \( C \).

Dec(\( SK, C \)): To decrypt a ciphertext \( C \) using private key \( SK \), compute
\[
C^\lambda = C^{uv\mu} = (g^m)^{uv\mu}(h^r)^{uv\mu} = (g^m)^{uv(\mu r)} = g^m.
\]
Recall \( m \) by computing the discrete logarithm \( \log_g(g^m) \). This is efficient for small values of \( s \) [4].

Output \( QR_s(m) \).

\(^1\) \( s \) would typically be small enough for \( \log_g(g^m) \) to be precomputed.
Theorem 1 (Semantic security of CS). The public-key encryption scheme defined by $CS = \{Gen, Enc, Dec\}$ is semantically secure under chosen plaintext attack.

Proof. We begin with the assumption that the public-key scheme due to Dargård et al. [29] (i.e., DGK) is semantically secure, and then show a reduction from their scheme to ours.

Suppose there existed an algorithm $A'$ that accepted an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ and a public-key $PK = (n, g, h, w, d, f, s, t)$, and had a non-negligible advantage in guessing whether $x$ was a generator of $G_{suw}$, i.e., whether $x$ is a valid non-zero ciphertext in $CS$.

We briefly recall the particulars of the DGK cryptosystem, maintaining its original variable naming conventions for the duration of this proof. Let $PK_{DGK} = (n, g, h, u, t)$ and $SK = (p, q, v_p, v_q)$ such that $v_q|(p - 1), v_q|(q - 1), n = pq$. Let be and $g, h$ generate subgroups of $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ as follows: $g$ has order $wp$ mod $p$ and order $v_q$ mod $q$, $h$ has order $v_p$ mod $p$ and order $v_q$ mod $q$. $Enc_{DGK}(m) = g^{mh^r}$ for $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Observe $Enc_{DGK}(0) = h^r$ is a generator of $G_{v_pv_q}$ whereas $Enc_{DGK}(m \neq 0) = g^{mh^r}$ is not. Thus the semantic security of DGK is broken by an algorithm guessing with advantage whether an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ is a generator $G_{v_pv_q}$.

Consider an algorithm $A$ that accepts a DGK public key $PK_{DGK}$ and an element $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ which outputs a guess whether $x$ is a generator of $G_{v_pv_q}$. Suppose $A(PK_{DGK}, x)$ calls $A'((PK', x)$ where $PK' = (n, g, h, t, 1, 1, u, 1)$ and outputs the result. $A'$ guesses if $x$ generates $G_{v_pv_q}$ with advantage, which allows $A$ to guess with advantage. By the assumed semantic security of DGK, $A$ does not exist implying neither can $A'$.

A. Homomorphic Properties

First, we observe that $CS$ is additively homomorphic:

\[
Enc(m_1) \cdot Enc(m_2) = g^{m_1 h^{r_1}} \cdot g^{m_2 h^{r_2}} = g^{m_1 + m_2} \cdot h^{r_1 + r_2} = Enc(m_1 + m_2 \mod s)
\]

We now define the functionality for homomorphically d-approximating the threshold function $\tau_d$.

Eval($PK, c$): Given ciphertext $c = Enc(m)$, sample blending factor $x \leftarrow [1, \ldots, s - 1]$ and compute

\[
eq (c \cdot Enc(f))^2 \mod n.
\]

Output $c'$.

Theorem 2 (Homomorphic d-approximation of $\tau_d$). For $0 \leq m < d$ and ciphertext $c = Enc(m)$, Eval($c$) homomorphically evaluates $\tau_d(m)$, i.e.,

\[
Dec(\text{Eval}(Enc(m))) = \tau_d(m).
\]

Proof. Expanding $\text{Eval}(Enc(m))$ we have:

\[
\text{Eval}(Enc(m)) = (Enc(m) \cdot Enc(f))^2 = (g^m h^{r_1} \cdot g^f h^{r_2})^2 = g^{(m+f)x^2 h^{r'}} = Enc((m + f) \cdot x^2) = c'
\]

By the law of quadratic reciprocity, the product of two elements $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ has the following property:

\[
\text{QR}_a(ab) = \text{QR}_a(a) \cdot \text{QR}_a(b).
\]

Therefore decrypting $c'$ gives:

\[
\text{Dec}(c') = \text{QR}_s((m + f) \cdot x^2) = \text{QR}_s(m + f) \cdot \text{QR}_s(x^2) = \text{QR}_s(m + f).
\]

Recall given $(t, d)$, Gen produces $s, f \in PK$ such that $\text{QR}_s(m + f) = \tau_d(m)$ for $0 \leq x \leq d$. Therefore $\text{Dec}(c') = \text{QR}_s(m + f) = \tau_d(m)$.

Theorem 3 (Blinding hiding). Decrypting $\text{Eval}(Enc(m))$ reveals no information about $m$ beyond what is revealed by $\tau_d(m)$.

Proof. Let $c' = \text{Enc}((m + f) \cdot x^2)$. Using $SK = \lambda$, the private-key holder decrypts $c'$ by computing:

\[
\text{Dec}(c') = (c') \lambda \mod n = (g^{(m+f)x^2 h^{r'}})^\lambda \mod n = g^{(m+f)x^2} \mod n.
\]

The private-key holder then computes the discrete logarithm base $g$ to recover $m' = (m + f) \cdot x^2 \mod s$, and outputs $\text{QR}_s(m')$.

The goal of the proof is to show that the $x^2$ factor Blinds $(m + f)$, and our approach is to show $m'$ is uniform in the set of quadratic residues modulo $s$ if $(m + f)$ is a quadratic residue, and $m'$ is uniform in the set of quadratic non-residues otherwise.

Recall that $m, f, d, x$ were defined such that $f > 0, 0 \leq m \leq d, f + d < s$, and $1 \leq x \leq s$. Therefore $(m + f) \cdot x^2 \mod s$.

Recall given $(t, d)$, Gen produces $s, f \in PK$ such that $\text{QR}_s(m + f) = \tau_d(m)$ for $0 \leq x \leq d$. Therefore $(m + f) \cdot x^2 \neq 0 \mod s$. Let $s = 2^i \cdot k + 1$ for odd $k$. There are two subgroups of $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ of interest: the subgroup $G_{2^j}$ of order $2^j$, and the subgroup $G_k$ of order $k$. Let $g_j$ and $g_k$ be generators of $G_{2^j}$ and $G_k$ respectively. Any element $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ can be expressed as

\[
a = g_j^{y_j} g_k^z \mod s
\]

for some $0 \leq y < 2^i$ and $0 \leq z < k$. Suppose $y$ is even. Then $a$ is a quadratic residue, since there exists a $b$ such that $b^2 = a \mod s$. By the same argument, if $y$ is odd, $a$ is a quadratic non-residue. With this approach let us rewrite $(m + f)$ and blind factor $x$ as follows:

\[
(m + f) = g_j^{y_1} g_k^{z_1} \mod s
\]

\[
x = g_j^{y_2} g_k^{z_2} \mod s.
\]
Therefore,
\[(m + f) \cdot x^2 = g_j^{y_j} \cdot g_k^{z_1} \cdot (g_j^{y_j} g_k^{z_2})^2 \mod s\]
\[= g_j^{y_j + 2y_2 + z_1 + 2z_2} \mod s.
\]
Since \(x\) is uniform in \(\mathbb{Z}_q^\ast\), then \(z_2\) is uniform in \(\mathbb{Z}_q^\ast\), and thus \(z_1 + 2z_2\) is uniform in \(\mathbb{Z}_q^\ast\). Similarly, \(y_2\) is uniform in \(\mathbb{Z}_q^\ast\), and thus if \(y_1\) is even, then \(y_1 + 2y_2\) is uniform in the set of non-zero even numbers modulo \(2^j\), and is uniform in the set of odd numbers modulo \(2^j\) otherwise. Therefore \(m' = (m + f) \cdot x^2\) is uniform among the quadratic residues modulo \(s\) if \((m + f)\) is quadratic residue, and is uniform among the quadratic non-residues otherwise.

VI. PROTOCOL FOR PRIVATE THRESHOLD APPROXIMATE MATCHING

In this section, we present our semi-honest secure protocol for computing the approximate string matching for records linkage functionality (Functionality 1).

The protocol consists of two sub-protocols. The first sub-protocol is a protocol to compute the private set intersection cardinality of string bigrams homomorphically. The second sub-protocol is a protocol to homomorphically compute the threshold Dice coefficient ThreshDice using the homomorphic \(d\)-approximation properties of \(CS\).

A. Privately Computing Set Intersection Cardinality

The first sub-protocol takes private inputs, \(A = [a_1, \ldots, a_n]\), \(B = [b_1, \ldots, b_m]\), and for each pair \(a_i \in A, b_j \in B\), produces an encryption of the set intersection cardinality of their bigrams, i.e.,
\[r_{ij} = \left| \left| \text{Bigrams}(a_i) \cap \text{Bigrams}(b_j) \right| \right|.
\]

Other public-key approaches exist for computing private set intersection cardinalities from unrestricted domains (see e.g. [33], [34]), however, given the restricted domain of this application, we are able to take a more efficient approach by exploiting the additive homomorphic properties of cryptosystem \(CS\). Let EncBigrams be a function that accepts a string and produces an encrypted bigram vector, in which the \(i\)-th ciphertext encrypts the presence (or absence) of the \(i\)-th bigram in the string. The function is defined as follows:

EncBigrams(String \(s\), Public-key \(PK\))
for \(1 \leq i \leq 728\):
if \(BG(i) \in \text{Bigrams}(s)\):
\(c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(1)\)
else:
\(c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(0)\)
return \(C = [c_1, \ldots, c_{728}]\)

Let SetIntCard be a function that accepts a string \(s\) and an encrypted bigram vector and outputs an encryption of the set intersection cardinality between the bigrams of \(s\) and the bigrams in the encrypted bigram vector. The function is defined as follows:

SetIntCard(String \(s\), Encrypted vector \(C\), Public-key \(PK\))
\[r \leftarrow 1\]
for each \(bg \in \text{Bigrams}(s)\):
\(i \leftarrow \text{Index of } bg \text{ in } BG\)
\(r \leftarrow r \cdot c_i \mod n\), (where \(c_i\) is the \(i\)-th ciphertext in \(C\)).
return \(r\)

An example of SetIntCard is shown in Table II. We define the sub-protocol for privately computing set intersection cardinalities in Sub-protocol 1.

Sub-protocol 1: Private Records Set Intersection Cardinality

- **Public parameters**: Public key \(PK\).
- **Private inputs**: Party \(P_A\) holds a list of strings \(A = [a_1, \ldots, a_n]\), Party \(P_B\) holds a list of strings \(B = [b_1, \ldots, b_m]\).
- **The protocol**:
  1. For each \(a_i \in A\), \(P_A\) computes: \(C_i \leftarrow \text{EncBigrams}(a_i)\) and sends each \(C_i\) to \(P_B\)
  2. For each \(C_i\) and \(b_j \in B\), \(P_B\) computes:
     \[r_{ij} \leftarrow \text{SetIntCard}(b_j, C_i)\]
- **Output**: \(P_B\) outputs all encrypted set intersection cardinalities \(r_{ij}\)

**Theorem 4** (Correctness (Sub-protocol 1)). For each \(a_i \in A\) and \(b_j \in B\), Sub-protocol 1 outputs
\[r_{ij} = \left| \left| \text{Bigrams}(a_i) \cap \text{Bigrams}(b_j) \right| \right|.
\]

**Proof**. For each \(a_i \in A\) and \(b_j \in B\), \(r_{ij}\) steps 1 and 2 compute:
\[r_{ij} = \text{SetIntCard}(b_j, \text{EncBigrams}(a_i))\]

SetIntCard is run by \(P_B\), who selects encrypted bigram \(c_i \in C\) if and only if the \(i\)-th bigram is in \(\text{Bigrams}(b_j)\). The selected ciphertext is \([1]\) if the \(i\)-th bigram is also in \(\text{Bigrams}(a_i)\), and \([0]\) otherwise. By the additive homomorphic property of \(CS\), the multiplication of all ciphertexts produces an encryption of the sum of the respective plaintexts.

For each bigram \(bg \in BG\), SetIntCard selects ciphertexts of the form \([1]\) if and only if \(bg \in \text{Bigrams}(a_i)\) and \(\text{Bigrams}(b_j)\), and selects either \([0]\), or no ciphertext otherwise. Therefore, the product of all the ciphertexts will be the encryption of the sum of all bigrams \(bg \in BG\) where \(bg \in \text{Bigrams}(a_i)\) and \(\text{Bigrams}(b_j)\), i.e., the encryption of \(\|\text{Bigrams}(a_i) \cap \text{Bigrams}(b_j)\|\).

B. Privately Computing the Threshold Dice Coefficient

The next step is to define a sub-protocol for computing the threshold dice coefficient given two privately input set cardinalities \(\ell_a = |a|, \ell_b = |b|\), and the output from Sub-protocol 1, i.e., \(\text{Enc}([a \cap b])\). We rearrange the threshold Dice equation into an instance of the threshold function \(\tau_i\), and use the properties of \(CS\) to homomorphically evaluate \(\tau_i\).
Theorem 5 (Correctness (Sub-protocol 2)). Given strings $a, b$ as private inputs, and an encryption of their set intersection cardinality $c$, Sub-protocol 2 outputs an encryption of the threshold Dice coefficient, i.e.,

$$\text{ThreshDice}(\text{Bigrams}(a), \text{Bigrams}(b), t).$$

Proof. In Step 2 of Sub-protocol 2, $P_A$ computes $\text{DiceOffset}(\ell_a, \ell_b, t, \mu)$ for each possible set cardinality of $\ell_b = |\text{Bigrams}(b)|$, and in Step 3, $P_B$ selects the corresponding $\theta_{\ell_b}$. Therefore,

$$\theta_{\ell_b} = \text{DiceOffset}(\ell_a, \ell_b, t, \mu) = \mu - \left\lceil \frac{t}{2} (\ell_a + \ell_b) \right\rceil + 1.$$

We construct our $d$-approximation of $\tau_t$ to handle all possible inputs to ThreshDice up to a maximum set intersection cardinality. Let $\mu$ be defined as the maximal allowable set cardinality size, i.e., the respective upper bounds of $\ell_a$ and $\ell_b$, and $|A \cap B|$. Parameterize $d, t \in \mathcal{P}_K$ such that $d = 2 \cdot \mu$ and $t = \mu$.

We can then use CS to homomorphically evaluate whether an encrypted plaintext is less than, or equal to $\mu$ for a plaintext in the range $1 \ldots 2\mu$. Our approach is to pre-compute a value $\theta$ such that $\theta + |A \cap B| \geq \mu$ if and only if ThreshDice would have yielded a match given the two inputs. Let

$$\text{DiceOffset}(\ell_a, \ell_b, t, \mu) = \mu - \left\lceil \frac{t}{2} (\ell_a + \ell_b) \right\rceil + 1.$$

We now define the second sub-protocol (Sub-protocol 2), which accepts $P_A$’s and $P_B$’s strings as private inputs, and a ciphertext of their set intersection cardinality, and outputs an encryption of ThreshDice evaluated on the input strings.

**Sub-protocol 2: Private Threshold Dice Coefficient**

- **Public parameters:** Public key $PK$. Maximum set cardinality $\mu$. Encrypted set-intersection cardinality $c = |\text{Bigrams}(a) \cap \text{Bigrams}(b)|$
- **Private inputs:** $P_A$’s string $a$, $P_B$’s string $b$
- **The protocol:**
  1) $P_A$ computes: $\ell_a = |\text{Bigrams}(a)|$
  2) For $2 \leq i \leq \mu$, $P_A$ computes:
     $$\theta_i = \text{Enc}(\text{DiceOffset}(\ell_a, i, t, \mu))$$
  3) $P_A$ sends $\theta_2 \ldots \theta_{\mu}$ to $P_B$ in order.
  4) $P_B$ computes: $\ell_b = |\text{Bigrams}(b)|$
  5) $P_B$ selects $\theta_{\ell_b}$ from the list
  6) $P_B$ computes $d = \text{Eval}(\theta_{\ell_b} \cdot c)$
- **Output:** $P_B$ outputs $d$.

By Theorem 2, $\text{Dec}(\text{Eval}(\text{Enc}(m))) = \tau_{\mu}(m)$. Let $c = |\text{Bigrams}(a) \cap \text{Bigrams}(b)|$. Next recall that $d, t \in \mathcal{P}_K$ were selected such that $d = 2 \cdot \mu$ and $t = \mu$. Therefore

$$\text{Dec}(\text{Eval}(\theta_{\ell_b} \cdot c)) = \text{Dec}(\text{Eval}(\theta_{\ell_b} \cdot \ell_{a \cap b})) = \text{Dec}(\text{Eval}(\theta_{\ell_b} + \ell_{a \cap b})) = \tau_{\mu}(\theta_{\ell_b} + \ell_{a \cap b}) = \tau_{\mu}(\ell_a + \ell_b) + 1 + \ell_{a \cap b}.$$

By the definition of $\tau$ in Equation 5, $\tau_{\mu}(\ell_a + \ell_b + \ell_{a \cap b}) = 1$ if $\ell_a + \ell_b + \ell_{a \cap b} \geq \mu$ (and 0 otherwise). This condition, in turn, is satisfied if and only if $\ell_{a \cap b} \geq \left\lceil \frac{t}{2} (\ell_a + \ell_b) \right\rceil - 1$. Similarly, ThreshDice() outputs 1 if $\frac{2\ell_{a \cap b}}{\ell_a + \ell_b} \geq t$ (and 0 otherwise), i.e., $\ell_{a \cap b} \geq \frac{t}{2} (\ell_a + \ell_b)$. Therefore,

$$\text{Dec}(\text{Eval}(\theta_{\ell_b} \cdot c)) = \text{ThreshDice}(\text{Bigrams}(a), \text{Bigrams}(b)).$$

C. Private approximate matching for records linkage

We realize Functionality 1 in Protocol 1 using Sub-protocols 1 and 2.

**Protocol 1: Implementing Functionality 1 (Approximate string matching for records linkage)**

- **Public parameters:** Public key $PK$. Maximum set cardinality $\mu$. Encrypted set-intersection cardinality $c = |\text{Bigrams}(a) \cap \text{Bigrams}(b)|$
- **Private inputs:** Party $P_A$ holds a list of strings $A = [a_1, \ldots, a_n]$, and private key $SK$. Party $P_B$ holds a list of strings $B = [b_1, \ldots, b_m]$.
- **The protocol:**
  1) $P_A$ and $P_B$ run Sub-protocol 1 on their respective private inputs $A, B$, producing encrypted set intersection cardinalities $\tau_{ij}$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$ and $1 \leq j \leq m$.
  2) For each $\tau_{ij}$, $P_A$ and $P_B$ run Sub-protocol 2 on their respective private inputs $a_i$, $b_j$, producing encrypted threshold Dice coefficient $d_{ij}$.
  3) For each $d_{ij}$, $P_B$ sends $\langle d_{ij}, i \rangle$ to $P_A$ in randomly shuffled order.
- **Output:** For all $\langle d_{ij}, i \rangle$ where $\text{Dec}(d_{ij}) = 1$, $P_A$ outputs $i$. 

### TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>Q</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[0]</td>
<td>[0]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[0]</td>
<td>[0]</td>
<td>[0]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[0]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>[1]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[0 \cdot [1] \cdot [0] \cdot [1] \cdot [1] \cdot [1] \mod n = [5] \]
Theorem 6 (Correctness (Protocol 1)). Protocol 1 implements Functionality 1 for approximate string matching for records linkage, i.e., for all strings $a_i \in \mathcal{A}$ and $b_j \in \mathcal{B}$, $P_A$ learns the index $i$ of any string $a_i \in \mathcal{A}$ for which $\text{ThreshDice}(\text{Bigrams}(a_i), \text{Bigrams}(b_j), t) = 1$.

Proof. The proof follows from the proofs of Theorems 4 and 5.

D. Privacy of approximate string matching protocol

We now prove Protocol 1 securely realizes Functionality 1 in the semi-honest adversary model. We employ a simulation-based approach to prove that, for all possible inputs $A$ by $P_A$ (resp. $B$ by $P_B$), all possible messages received from $P_B$ (resp. $P_A$), and all internally generated randomness, $P_A$’s (resp. $P_B$’s) view of the protocol execution can be efficiently simulated given only $P_A$’s (resp. $P_B$’s) own input and output.

Theorem 7 ($P_A$’s privacy). Let $P_A$’s input to the protocol $x_A = (A, PK, SK, \mu)$ and $P_B$’s input to the protocol be $x_B = B$, and their combined input be denoted as $x$. Let $\text{View}_{P_A}(x)$ represent $P_A$’s view of the protocol during execution of Protocol 1. $P_B$ has no output from Functionality 1 which we denote as $\text{F}_3(x) = \perp$. Let $f_A(x)$ denote the output of Functionality 1 on the combined input $x$. $P_A$ outputs $f_A(x) = f_1(x)$. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $P^*_A$ such that

$$[P^*_A(x_B, \perp), F_1(x)] \equiv [\text{View}_{P_A}(x), \text{Output}_{P_A}(x)].$$

Proof. Proving $P_A$’s privacy is straightforward, as $P_B$ only ever receives a fixed number of ciphertexts from $P_A$. By the semantic security of the encryption scheme (see Theorem 1), a ciphertext is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform value in $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$. To simulate $P^*_A$’s view in Sub-protocol 1, for each $a_i \in A$, $P^*_A$ samples $C_i \in \{r_1, \ldots, r_{728}\}$ where each $r_j \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. The rest of $P^*_B$’s view of Sub-protocol 1 (Step 2 and Output) is computed by simulating the $r_j$s directly from the respective $C_i$’s, $P^*_B$’s input $B$, and $PK$. To simulate $P^*_B$’s view in each invocation of Sub-protocol 2, for each $[\theta_i]$, $P^*_B$ samples $r_i \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n^*$. The rest of $P^*_B$’s view of Sub-protocol 2 is simulated by computing $\text{Eval}(r_i, c)$ from $b, c$ and $r_i$. $P^*_B$’s view of Steps 1 and 2 of Protocol 1, therefore, can be simulated by simulating Sub-protocols 1 and 2 as described above. The remainder of $P^*_B$’s view of Protocol 1 (i.e., Step 3) can be computed directly from the $d_{ij}$’s output of Sub-protocol 2.

Theorem 8 ($P_B$’s privacy). Let $\text{View}_{P_B}(x)$ represent $P_B$’s view of the protocol during execution of Protocol 1, with all other inputs and outputs defined as in $P_A$’s case above. There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $P^*_B$ such that

$$[P^*_B(x_A, F_1(x)), \perp] \equiv [\text{View}_{P_B}(x), \perp].$$

Proof. $P_B$’s privacy relies on the blinding properties of the Eval function of $CS$. To simulate $P_B$’s view of Sub-protocol 1, $P^*_B$ computes each $C_i$ directly from each $a_i$. $P_A$ does not see step 2 or the output, concluding $P_A$’s view of Sub-protocol 1. To simulate $P_A$’s view of an instance of Sub-protocol 2, $P^*_A$ computes steps 1-3 directly from its private input string $a$ and public inputs. $P_A$ does not see steps 4-6. In Step 3 of Protocol 1, $P_A$ receives and decrypts all $d_{ij}$’s received from $P_B$, and outputs the index $i$ of any $d_{ij}$ for which $\text{Dec}(d_{ij}) = 1$. To simulate this, $P^*_A$ outputs $f_1(x)$ to see which records $a_i \in A$ were found to be an approximate match of some record in $B$. For all such $a_i$, it chooses a uniform random $1 \leq j \leq m$, and a random $\alpha \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $\text{QR}_s(\alpha) = 1$ and computes $d_{ij} = \text{Enc}(\alpha) = g^{\alpha h^*} \text{mod } n$. For all other $d_{ij}$, it chooses a uniform random $1 \leq j \leq m$, and a random $\beta \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ such that $\text{QR}_s(\beta) = 0$ and computes $d_{ij} = \text{Enc}(\beta) = g^{\beta h^*} \text{mod } n$. By Theorem 6, $\text{Dec}(d_{ij}) = 1$ if records $a_i \in A$ and $b_j \in B$ approximately match (Dec($d_{ij}$) = 0 otherwise). By Theorem 5 (blinding hiding), for all $d_{ij} = g^{m h^*} \text{mod } n$, $m$ is a uniform quadratic residue in $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ if the records match, and therefore indistinguishable from the simulated value $\alpha$. Similarly $m$ is a uniform quadratic non-residue if the records do not match, and therefore indistinguishable from $\beta$.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE

In line with related work [4], [10] we used the North Carolina Voter Registration dataset maintained by the North Carolina State Board of Elections. The list contained 7.8M records at the time of writing. Records consist of a voter’s name, address, and other demographic data. We used the last_name column to create our dataset.

A. Implemented CS and Protocol 1

We implemented the encryption scheme $CS$ from Section V and Protocol 1 in Python. We used the gmpy2 library for faster modular exponentiation. We implemented the outer encryption using DGK, which offers fast encryption/decryption due to small randomizer subgroups $h$, as well as the ability to perform decryption modulo $p$ instead of modulo $n$. We precomputed powers of $g$ and $h$ for faster exponentiation and precomputed $\log_g g^m$ and $\text{QR}_s(m)$ for faster decryption. We benchmarked on an Intel Xeon E5-2697A @ 2.60GHz. For key size $|n| = 2048$, we achieved an encryption/decryption round trip time of under 500 $\mu$s. With $|n| = 15,360$, the round trip time was in the low milliseconds. The performance of $CS$ is given in Table III.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security level (bits)</th>
<th>Enc (ms)</th>
<th>Blind (ms)</th>
<th>Dec (ms)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>112 ($</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>= 2048,</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128 ($</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>= 3072,</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192 ($</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>= 7680,</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>256 ($</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>= 15560,</td>
<td>u</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III

Performance of cryptosystem CS.

https://www.ncsbe.gov/data-stats/other-election-related-data
https://github.com/aleksesse/Residue-Homomorphic-Encryption
B. Computing Parameters to Approximate \( \tau \)

Protocol 1 requires suitable parameterizations to \( 2\mu \)-approximate threshold function \( \tau_\mu \). Finding appropriate group orders \( s \) and offsets \( \ell \) was done through a brute-force search by examining successively larger primes for suitable subsequences of quadratic residues. For each successively larger prime \( s \), the quadratic residuosity of \( 2, \ldots, (s - 2) \) modulo \( s \) was computed, and the resulting sequence was searched for any subsequences consisting of \( \mu \) quadratic non-residues, followed by \( \mu \) quadratic residues. We found instead that approximating the complement of \( \tau \) consistently yielded smaller minimum group orders. Table V lists computationally derived minimal parameters for \( 2\mu \)-approximating threshold function \( \tau_\mu \), i.e., the complement of \( \tau_\mu \). These parameters can be used to implement Protocol 1 by changing the output such that \( P_A \) outputs \( i \) if \( \text{Dec}(d_{ij}) = 0 \) (as opposed to 1).

The longest surname in the NC voter registry is 25 characters, and Table V accommodates approximate matching up to \( \mu = 26 \). Although our approach can accommodate all real-world surnames found in the dataset, future work will focus on developing new methods to extend the upper bound on \( \mu \), to allow matching of longer strings in other applications.

C. Matching Accuracy

The Bloom filter encoding literature typically employs stochastic “data corrupting” algorithms to introduce realistic typographic and transcription errors. As our protocol implements the threshold Dice coefficient, by definition there are no matching errors relative to the ideal functionality, and thus we do not examine the issue of corruptions.

A more meaningful comparison is the matching accuracy of Bloom filter encodings against the ideal functionality in the absence of corruptions. Therefore we are interested only in how often distinct records trigger a match (false positives). We randomly selected \( |A| = |B| = 1000 \) unique names from the North Carolina list and matched using Protocol 1 with BFEs of different sizes. Each record \( a_i \in A \) was compared against each record \( b_i \in B \). If \( a_i \) was found to match one or more records in \( B \), a false positive was recorded. The number of records in \( A \) that generated a false positive was divided by \( |A| \) to give the false positive rate. For BFEs, we set the number of hash functions \( k \) and filter bit length \( \ell \) based on the same ratios of \( k/\ell \) explored by Kuzu et al. [4]. The results of the comparison are shown in Figure 1 demonstrating the accuracy of our scheme relative to BFEs at the same match threshold, especially in Grzebala and Cheatham’s recommended range of \( 0.55 \leq t \leq 0.75 \).

D. Record Linking Experiment

Finally, we conducted a proof-of-concept linkage experiment on two medium-sized databases of \( |A|, |B| = 20,000 \) records. We used a Digital Ocean high-cpu droplet with Intel Xeon CPU E5-2697A @ 2.60GHz, 32CPUs, 46GB memory, and 1 TB drive. We capped name lengths at 20 characters, and used a Dice coefficient threshold of 0.9 with a \( |n| = 2048 \)-bit modulus. As an additional optimization, \( P_A \) sent \( |\text{Bigrams}(a_i)| \) in plaintext, allowing \( P_B \) to decide whether a match would be possible for two records of length \( |A|, |B| \) at the given threshold \( T \), and to skip it otherwise.

The protocol consists of three stages: encrypting bigram sets on \( P_A \)’s end, homomorphic matching on \( P_B \)’s end, and finally decryption on \( P_A \)’s end. Each stage consists of numerous independent cryptographic operations, which we broke into multiple jobs and ran as separate Python processes. The performance of each stage is presented in Table V.

Bigram encryption took just under 4 minutes and generated 5 GB of ciphertext data. Homomorphic matching took 1.35 hours and generated about 71 GB of ciphertext data. Decryption took 22 minutes. The total linking time was 1.8 hours at a total cloud computing cost of $1.90 (USD).

VIII. Conclusion

We introduced a novel cryptographic construction to homomorphically approximate a threshold function in a restricted domain, and a protocol to securely implement the threshold Dice coefficient. Relative to Bloom filter encodings, our scheme offers formal security guarantees and improved accuracy. Through this work, we hope to initiate a new avenue of research for the challenge of secure approximate matching.
### TABLE IV

| | $|A|, |B| = 100$ Records | $|A|, |B| = 1000$ Records |
|---|---|---|
|Encrypt record bigrams ($P_{A}$) | 39 | 39 |
|Homomorphic Dice threshold ($P_{G}$) | 3.0 | 1.9 |
|Decrypt results ($P_{A}$) | 1.4 | 0.4 |

### TABLE V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Max set size ($\mu$)</th>
<th>Offset ($f$)</th>
<th>Group order ($s$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
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### REFERENCES


