SE 4472

Information Security

Week 7

Public-key Cryptography

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Western Engineering

Symmetric-key cryptography

In terms of cryptographic primitives, we've covered ciphers (block ciphers, stream ciphers), message authentication codes (MACs), and hashes. Hashes don't require a key, but ciphers and MACs each require a *secret* key.

- The secret key k is used to ”do” something (i.e., encrypt, resp. MAC)
- The secret key k is also used to ”undo” that something (i.e., decrypt, resp. verify MAC)
- Called *symmetric*-key because the *do* key is the same as the *undo* key

Symmetric-key cryptography

In our Alice/Bob/Eve communication model, who knows the secret key k?

- Alice knows k
- Bob knows k
- Eve does not know k
- It should be computationally infeasible to guess k

The Million Dollar Question

Suppose Alice wants to communicate privately with Bob. She could generate a key and encrypt her message with a block cipher. Bob, however, will require this key to be able to decrypt her message.

Question: How does Alice communicate the secret key k to Bob while keeping it secret from Eve?

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The Goal

Alice and Bob want to communicate privately. They need to agree on a shared secret (a key), but only have an insecure network over which to communicate.

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4. Bob sends ID d_i to Alice
5. Alice and Bob begin communicating securely using key k_i

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Questions: How does this prevent Eve from guessing k_i? Is this approach practical?

Asymmetric-key Cryptography

Asymmetric-key cryptography

Let's now consider a new class of cryptographic primitive. This primitive will make use of two distinct keys: a *public* key PU and a *private* key PR.

- The public key PU is used to ”do” something (e.g., encrypt)
- The private key PR is used to ”undo” that something (e.g., decrypt)
- Called *asymmetric*-key because the *do* key is different from *undo* key

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Asymmetric-key cryptography

In our Alice/Bob/Eve communication model, who knows the public and private keys PU, PR?

- Alice knows the public key PU
- Bob knows the public and private PU, PR
- Eve knows the public key
- Anyone and everyone can know the public key
- It should be computationally infeasible to guess the private key
- It should be computationally infeasible to recover the private key given the public key

Terminology

- Asymmetric-key crypto systems are more commonly called ”Public-key” systems.
- The public and private keys are jointly refered to as a *key pair*.
- Use *secret key* when talking about the key of a symmetric-key cryptosystem
- Use *private key* when talking about the secret/private key of a asymmetric-key cryptosystem

Applications of Public-key Cryptography

- Encryption/decryption (e.g., RSA)
- Key agreement/exchange (e.g., Diffie-Hellman: DHE, ECDHE, etc)
- Digital signatures (e.g., RSA, Elgamal, DSA, ECDSA, etc)
- Advanced: secure/homomorphic computation, zero-knowledge proofs, etc

Math Primer

Discrete Logarithms: math primer

Let

- p, q be prime numbers such that $p = \alpha q + 1$ for some integer α
- $\mathbb{Z}_n$ denote the set of integers modulo an integer n
- the multiplicative inverse of a number $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, denoted a^{-1}, be an integer in $\mathbb{Z}_n$ such that $aa^{-1} = 1 \mod n$
- $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ be the set of integers modulo n for which a multiplicative inverse exists. If n is prime, $\mathbb{Z}_p = \{1, 2, \ldots, n-1\}$

Discrete Logarithms: math primer

Let

- a be an element in $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Let t be the smallest integer such that $a^t = 1 \mod p$. We call t the *order* of a. If $t = p$ then we say a is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.
- a is called a *generator* because the set $\{a^0, a^1 \dots a^{p-2}\} = \{1, \dots, p-1\}$, i.e., a *generates* the set $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. For example, 6 generates $\mathbb{Z}_{13}^*$ since $\{6^1 = 6 \mod 13, 6^2 = 10 \mod 13, 6^3 = 8 \mod 13, \dots, 6^{12} = 1 \mod 13\}$
- $\mathbb{G}_q$ denote a cyclic subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_{|}^*$ of order q. An element $a \in \mathbb{G}_q$ is also an element $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Let g be a generator of $\mathbb{G}_q$
- $a \in_R A$ denote an element a drawn independently and uniformly at random from set A. $a \in_R \mathbb{G}_q$, therefore, would denote a random element in $\mathbb{G}_q$

$\mathbb{G}_q$: an example

Let $q = 11$ and $p = 23 = 2 * q + 1$. Let $g = 6$.

$$\begin{aligned}
6^1 &\mod 23 = 6 \\
6^2 &\mod 23 = 13 \\
6^3 &\mod 23 = 9 \\
6^4 &\mod 23 = 8 \\
6^5 &\mod 23 = 2 \\
6^6 &\mod 23 = 12 \\
6^7 &\mod 23 = 3 \\
6^8 &\mod 23 = 18 \\
6^9 &\mod 23 = 16 \\
6^{10} &\mod 23 = 4 \\
6^{11} &\mod 23 = 1 \\
6^{12} &\mod 23 = 6 \\
6^{13} &\mod 23 = 13 \\
&\vdots
\end{aligned}$$

$\mathbb{G}_q$: a full-scale example

2048-bit modulus. Let:

p =
1699897197819409959350395909560868339296707333513338850260792175269377461667909345106189
4007390651442940991437007217396778219812942355822485419132091732942087052688780401771105
5077916007496804049206725568956610515399196848621653907978580213217522397058071043503404
700268425750722626265208099856407306527012763

q =
8499485989097049796751979547804341696483536667566694251303960876346887308339546725530947
0036953257214704957185036086983891099064711779112427095660458664710435263443902008855527
5389580037484020246033627844783052576995984243108269539892901066087611985290355217517023
50134212875361313132604049928203653263506381

g =
6811145128679259384514506369165999341022181280687423436585450471905740185837259494289329
1581957322023471947260828209362467690671421429979048643907159864269436501403220400197614
3089044605475295746938752186625055539386825735547196324910243046376438686033381140427605
29545510633271426088675581644231528918421974

$\mathbb{G}_q$: a full-scale example

Try it for yourself in a Python command line:

```
>>> g**2%p
```

```
7868561465852767168535877469150839014533636907794303563749025200723864470735156596654449
9964565109242525722680966879319045332149033624253533553705188800820306775346364385456081
9837040305333253946350048768241942227777332942718344921601872312324632112234290209388173
874001621564120301400106229647621472329381 72
```

```
>>> g**3%p =
```

```
9330114779345580939484179789597298690260403750404885274182886474168552330554964253269877
7805035962128777511734695474769570333684953304250729699841923239590754869761035510310467
3380434003110925615598887252074369149132484160888674079252315630580538390956978412596567
4215744157541363995851670270410636028216723 7
```

```
>>> g**(q-1)%p
```

```
3367616480157963046716355041037478200291764055973664780592326569211350886084056857190221
5616086225978249457926967010402533726919077542155914501602289719125842308243545002368037
4701884700401430621838112321925898253632244044710276421178889345050342849101359479604575
939828087182234080192672254895533496548939 67
```

```
>>> g**q%p
```

```
1
```

Note: Python is not optimized to do big exponentiations, so computing g^q is going to take a while

The Discrete Logarithm Problem

Suppose I gave you p, q, g and the following value:

$a = g^r \mod p =$

7761516522504115160666720615331157084358293977621678172040634482850830300841549839295
3290749161513200526414616153213047248518571823690134646919084186738680900674060474642
1791799479531358291540981935563613210692823031038873030722308677544198575890762028642253
5559851205240831649584897905358227733895893230228 6

Could you tell me what r was?

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Could you tell me what r was?

Short answer: No, you can't, or more specifically, it would be computationally infeasible to do so. This is the *discrete log* problem, and the infeasibility of solving it is an important computational hardness assumption that we can use to build a key agreement protocol.

The Discrete Logarithm Problem

The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) can stated as follows: let $\mathbb{G}_q$ be a cyclic sub group $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ of order q with generator g.

Given $\langle p, q, g \rangle$ and a value $a = g^b \mod p$ for some $b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, determine b.

Diffie-Hellman

The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol

- Proposed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976
- Uses the discrete logarithm problem to generate a public key $PU_A = g^a$ from a private key $PR_A = a$
- Uses the commutative nature of exponentiation: $(g^a)^b = (g^b)^a = g^{ab}$

The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol

A	B
$a \in_R \mathbb{G}_q$	$b \in_R \mathbb{G}_q$

The Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol

$$\begin{tikzcd}
\text{A} & & \text{B} \\
a \in_R \mathbb{G}_q & & b \in_R \mathbb{G}_q \\
& \arrow[r, "g^a"] & {}
\end{tikzcd}$$

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\end{tikzcd}$$

Exercise: what values are public keys, private keys and secret keys?

The Diffie-Hellman Problem

The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP), stated as follows:

Given g, g^a, g^b compute g^{ab}. This is assumed to be hard if the DL problem is hard.

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The collection of values $\langle g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab} \rangle$ is called a Diffie Hellman *tuple*. Another useful assumption is the Decisional Diffie Hellman assumption (DDH), stated as follows:

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Given $\langle g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab} \rangle$ and $\langle g, g^a, g^b, g^c \rangle$ for $a, b, c \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$, decide which is the valid Diffie Hellman tuple. This is assumed to be hard if $g \in \mathbb{G}_q$ and the DLP is hard in $\mathbb{G}_q$. DDH is useful for proving the CPA-security of cryptosystems based on DLP.

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Diffie-Hellman is **highly** susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. The goal of the attack is for Eve to be able to eavesdrop on Alice and Bob. The attack proceeds as follows:

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4. Eve applies the same strategy in reverse when Bob sends a message to Alice

Conclusion

1. Diffie-Hellman was an extremely important discovery: now two parties who have never met can exchange messages over an insecure network to arrive at a shared secret
2. Widely used by TLS (Diffie-Hellman key exchange, or DHE)
3. MITM attacks are a real-word threat. You *need* to know who you are talking to.